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CREDITORS' RIGHTS ISSUES IN COPYRIGHT LAW:
CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION*
Charles Shafert
Although preferring voluntary payment from debtors, creditors
must often compel the sale of debtors' property to satisfy debts.
Ordinarily, state law controls the acquisition of a judgment or a
security interest, andfederal law controls when there is a federal
tax lien or a bankruptcy proceeding. However, if the debtor's
property to be sold is a copyright, ooth federal and state creditors' law must be reconciled with federal copyright law. The author briefly reviews recent devefopments in both creditors' and
copyright law, discusses areas in which creditors' rights law and
the Copyright Act conflict, and suggests resolution of these conflicts by considering the underlying rationale ofthe taws, emphasizing the Copyright Act's purpose ofproviding authors with a
sujJicient monopoly to encourage creativity.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The drafters of the United States Constitution, recognizing the significance of creativity, granted to Congress the power to give "Authors"
exclusive rights in their "writings.") The drafters also recognized that
only a monopoly sufficient to encourage socially useful creativity was
necessary and therefore provided that the exclusive rights should exist
for only a "Limited Time."2 Pursuant to this constitutional grant, Congress enacted a copyright statute, the current version of which gives
creators not only exclusive rights in their works but also the power to
sell those rights. 3 As a property right which the author may sell, a
copyright is also a right which creditors of the owner should be able to
use in satisfaction of the owner's debts.4

* Copyright, 1982 by Charles Shafer, Baltimore, Maryland.
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1.

2.
3.

4.

B.A., Marietta College, 1967; J.D., Rutgers University School of Law, 1978; Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The term "author" includes artists, composers, choreographers, and other creators. The term "writings" includes records, films,
paintings, statues, and other works. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c.
§ 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980). In this article, any reference to "author" includes all
creators of copyrightable works.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 201(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The copyright statute
has been periodically revised since originally enacted by the first Congress. Prior
to the 1976 Act, the most recent thorough revision had been in 1909. H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5738-39 [hereinafter cited as House Report with page citations to
[1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS].
The fact that a copyright may be seized makes it of more, not less, value to the
owner. The availability of the copyright as an asset increases the net worth of the
owner, to which creditors look when deciding whether to extend credit, even if
unsecured.
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Issues involving creditors' use of copyrights have surfaced in few
recorded cases. 5 Perhaps one reason for this dearth of cases is that the
value of literary and artistic property has only recently been great
enough to warrant widespread use of copyrights to satisfy debts or to
resort to litigation. 6 It is more likely that conceptual and procedural
difficulties arising from the conflicting federal and state statutes have
limited the apparent usefulness of copyright to creditors.
Creditors' rights and responsibilities are governed by a variety of
federal and state statutes. When a creditor procures an agreement from
a debtor allowing the creditor to keep or sell named property upon the
debtor's default, the creditor is secured and his 7 rights and obligations,
as well as priorities between creditors, are controlled by state Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) provisions. 8 When a judgment creditor9
seeks satisfaction by sale of the debtor's property, his duties and the
procedures for such sale are ruled by other state statutory provisions. 10
In cases involving the federal government as a creditor, federal statutes
such as the Tax Lien Act l l mandate still other procedures upon default l2 and often afford the government a higher priority as to the
5. The only reported cases which deal with creditors' attempts to satisfy obligations
by the sale of copyrights are the following: Stephens v. Cady, 55 V.S. (14 How.)
528 (1852) (execution sale of engraving did not pass title to copyright); Platt &
Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963) (local lien law
notwithstanding, unpaid manufacturer of copyrighted goods may not sell those
goods without court determination that failure to pay was unjustified); Republic
Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952) (state
courts have jurisdiction over copyright foreclosure); In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F.
886 (2d Cir.) (copyrights can only be mortgaged under federal law), cerl. denied
sub nom. Green v. Felder, 256 U.S. 704 (1921); Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sheriff's sale of films does not
constitute sale of copyrights); Independent Film Distribs., Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Ind., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (court questions but does not resolve
potential conflict between state created lien on motion pictures and Copyright
Act), rev'd on other grounds, 250 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1958); In re P.H. McBride &
Co., 132 F. 285 (S.D. N.Y. 1904) (court deals with assignability of copyright by
bankruptcy trustee).
6. See Note, Transfers of Copyrights for Security Under the New Copyright Act, 88
YALE L.J. 125, 125 nn.2 & 4 (1978).
7. The use of any gender in this article shall include the other gender, whenever
appropriate.
S. The VCC, prepared by the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has gone through a number of revisions, the most significant being the revisions of Article Nine in 1972 and Article
Eight in 1977, with conforming amendments throughout the Code. This last revision is referred to as the 1978 Official Text.
9. A judgment creditor is "one who has obtained a judgment against his debtor,
under which he can enforce execution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980-81 (4th
ed. 1968).
10. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-401 to -503 (1980 & Supp.
1982); MD. R.P. 619-628, Fl to G61.
11. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
12. Id § 6322 (1976).
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debtor's property. 13 Finally, if the debtor seeks relief under the bankruptcy laws, the formalities and priorities relevant to use of the debtor's
property to satisfy obligations are governed by the federal Bankruptcy
Act. 14 In any of these situations, if the property to be sold is a copyright, compliance with the federal Copyri~ht Act's provisions regulating the transfer of copyright ownership I may be mandated. Since
copyright law and creditors' rights law have developed independently
and serve different purposes, it is difficult to reconcile the resulting conflicting provisions.
This article reviews recent developments in both creditors' and
copyright law, cites and examines many of the conflicting statutory provisions, and discusses the problems presented by these conflicts. The
author suggests resolution of these conflicts by emphasizing the underlying constitutional purpose of copyright legislation: providing authors
with a sufficient monopoly to encourage creativity.
II.

BACKGROUND: RECENT STATUTORY
DEVELOPMENTS

Much of what has been written on this topic predates significant
changes in the law. 16 Three major components of the relevant law have
undergone complete statutory revisionY First, the rights of secured
creditors are now governed by Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as Article Nine),18 a statute which has
been in effect in most states for only about twenty years. 19 Prior to its
Id § 6323.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II V.S.c. §§ 101-1160 (Supp. IV 1980).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. §§ 201-205 (Supp. IV 1980).
The scholarly literature on the subject consists of the following: I G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 410-16, 542-46 (1965); Bramson,
Intellectual Property as Collateral-Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAW. 1567 (1981); Concoif, Motion Picture Secured Transactions
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Problems in Peifection, 13 V.c.L.A. L.
REV. 1214 (1966); Ditto, Musical Copyright as Collateral in Secured Transactions,
19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 219 (1971); Freeman, The Copyright asa Security, 12 J.B.A. KANSAS 257 (1944); Kaplan, Literary and Artistic Property (Including
Copyright) as Security: Problems Facing the Lender, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
254 (1954); Note, Copyright as Collateral in a Secured Transaction, 39 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 90 (1964); Note, Creditors' Rights Against Interests in Patents and Copyrights, 26 VA. L. REV. 1038 (1940); Note, Transfers of Copyrights for Security
Under the New Copyright Act, 88 YALE L.J. 125 (1978).
17. Only one component, state law concerning the rights of unsecured creditors, continues to change at a glacial pace. However, these changes, to the extent they are
intelligible, tend to lessen the obstacles a creditor must face in using a copyright to
satisfy a judgment. See text accompanying notes 113-33 infra.
18. In 1972, thirty-five states adopted revisions of Article Nine. VNIF. COMMERCIAL
CODE, I V.L.A. I (Supp. 1982). Many states have adopted non-uniform provisions. For a compilation, see the state correlation tables, V.c.c. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) (Supp. 1982).
19. Prior to 1960, only Pennsylvania and Massachusetts had adopted the VCc. By
1968, all states except Louisiana had adopted the Code. Louisiana adopted Arti13.
14.
15.
16.
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enactment it was questionable whether a copyright was susceptible to a
security interest, which of the forms of security interests would be appropriate, and what method of perfection was appropriate. To further
complicate the problem, the result varied from state to state. Now,
however, under Article Nine, a copyright is classified as a "general intangible" which may be the subject of a security interest. 2o Regardless
of what a transaction was termed prior to the adoption of Article Nine,
the term "security interest" now applies to all transactions in which
personal property secures an obligation,21 and filing an Article Nine
financing statement perfects a security interest in all general intangibles. 22 Article Nine is virtually uniform nationallaw. 23
The second revision involved the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 24 The substantive law of bankruptcy which relates to
copyrights changed very little. A copyright can be property of the
bankruptcy estate which the trustee may sell in liquidating the estate to
satisfy creditors. 25
Finally, copyrights themselves have been the subject of a thorough
statutory revision. The Copyright Act of 1976, which went into effect
on January 1, 1978, is the first revision of the federal copyright laws in
seventy years?6 Significant in the area of creditors' rights are the aspects of the new law relating to the creation and transfer of copyrights.
Under the previous version of the Copyright Act, federal copyright
protection usually began with the "publication" of a work.27 Before
publication, an author often had state law protection, which was called
common law copyright.28 The new Copyright Act has virtually eliminated common law copyrights. Now every author has a federally protected copyright in a work as soon as it is "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression."29 An author need not register or obtain any
certification in order to obtain a copyright in a work. For example,
although the author has no federally protected copyright in thoughts

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

cles One, Three, Four and Five in 1975, UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, I U.L.A. 1
(1976), and Articles Seven and Eight in 1978. fd (Supp. 1982).
U.c.c. § 9-lO6. Issues involving copyrights must be distinguished from assignments of payments due for the sale of copyrights. Such an assignment would be
of a general intangible, but state law regarding assignments would govern rather
than the Copyright Act.
fd § 9-102 comment 1.
fd § 9-302.
See note 18 supra.
11 U.S.C. §§ lOl-1160 (Supp. IV 1980).
See text accompanying notes 171-81 iTifra.
See House Report, supra note 3, at 5660.
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.c. §§ lO, 24 (1976) (repealed 1976). Publication
was generally defined as distribution of copies of a work to the public. fd § 26.
3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02, at 2-16-17 (1982). The term is
misleading in that some states also had statutes governing "common law" copyrights. Absent a statute, however, case law often served to protect an author's
unpublished work. fd
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § lO2(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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told to a friend, he does have a copyright when those thoughts are
placed on paper. However, the author must place a copyright notice on
the work if it is published. This notice consists of the word "copyright"
or the symbol C, the year of the publication, and the name of the copyright owner.30 If a work is published without such a notice, the work
may be considered to be in the public domain, which means it has no
copyright protection. 31 A copyright can be registered in the Copyright
Office by depositing the work and completing an application. 32 Although registration is not necessary for a work to have copyright protection, it is necessary to record ownership transfers and to obtain relief
for infringements. 33
The revisions regarding transfers of copyrights are particularly significant in the area of creditors' rights. Under the old Copyright Act
there was some question as to the legitimacy of an author's selling only
some of the rights secured by a copyright.34 The new Act explicitly
provides that an author may sell one or more of the rights secured by a
copyright and reserve to himself other rights. 35 Therefore, the author
may grant to a publisher the rights to produce and sell a book and may
grant to a studio the right to produce a movie based on that book.
The grant of a security interest is explicitly included within the
term "transfer of copyright ownership" as used in the Copyright Act. 36
All such ownership transfers can be recorded in the Copyright Office. 3?
That recordation gives all persons constructive notice of the transfer
only if the document "specifically identifies the work . . . [and] registration has been made for the work."38 Hence recordation is ineffective
if the work is unregistered.
The statute continues to have one priority provision to resolve disputes between conflicting transferees. The old Copyright Act essentially provided that if a transfer was not recorded within three months
of execution, it would be subordinate to a later good faith transfer
which was duly recorded. 39 The new Act provides:
Id § 401.
Id §§ 401,405.
Id § 408(a).
Id §§ 205(c), 411, 412.
See House Report, supra note 3, at 5738-39.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 106 (Supp. IV 1980).
Actually, the copyright statute defines a transfer to include a "mortgage" or "hypothecation." Id § 101. It is puzzling that the statute does not use the one term
by which Article Nine designates all such transactions, to wit, "security interests."
37. Id § 205(a).
38. Id § 205(c).
39. The old Act provided that
[e]very assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the copyright office
within three calendar months after its execution in the United States or
within six calendar months after its execution without the limits of the
United States, in default of which it shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, whose assignment has been duly recorded.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first
prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice . . . at any time before recordation in such
manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer
prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good
faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding
promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier
transfer. 40
Two provisions of the new Copyright Act which provide protection to authors and may have significant implications in the creditors'
rights area are a nonwaivable right of termination41 and a prohibition
of certain involuntary transfers. 42 The new right to terminate transfers
essentially allows an author to terminate or revoke a transfer of rights
thirty-five to forty years after the original grant was executed. 43 The
author must give at least two years, and no more than ten years, notice
of his intention to terminate the grant. 44 The Act prevents waiver of
this right. 45 The rationale is that the author is in an unfair bargaining
position since he cannot predict the value that a work will have many
years in the future. 46 Therefore, he should not be allowed to sell those
future rights.
The right of termination is a substitute for the old Act's renewal
provision, under which a copyright had a duration of twenty-eight
years with a right of renewal. 47 An author who sold rights in a work
actually sold those rights for only twenty-eight years. This led to the
practice of selling the right of renewal along with the copyright, and
courts recognized the validity of the sale of the renewal right. 48 Since
the right of termination is now nonwaivable, that right should not suffer the same fate as the right of renewal.
The second innovation in the Copyright Act is the provision
preventing involuntary transfers. 49 This provision prevents copyrights
from being seized by governmental units:
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author,
no action by any governmental body or other official organi40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Copyright Act of 1909, 17 V.S.c. § 30 (1976) (repealed 1976).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
ld § 203(a)(5).
ld § 201(e).
ld § 203(a)(3).
ld § 203(a)(4).
ld § 203(a)(5). "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any
future grant." ld
See House Report, supra note 3, at 5740.
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 V.S.c. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1976).
Eg., Fisher Music v. Witmark & Sons, 318 V.S. 643 (1943).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 201(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
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zation purportin& to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise
rights of ownershIp with respect to the copyright, or any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect
50

The purpose of the section is to prevent governments from silencing
dissidents by seizing the copyrights to their works. 5I The drafters of the
section were particularly concerned with possible action by Communist
governments. Arguably, if a government seized the copyright, the government could then rely on the International Copyright Convention to
prevent dissemination of the work in other countries. It has been
pointed out that this statutory remedy was unnecessary for the feared
evip2 As written, the provision may have serious implications in the
area of creditors' rights since seizure of a copyright by any government
official to satisfy a debt may be precluded. 53
Although this ends the discussion of the Copyright Act provisions
which are most significant to creditors, there is one relevant aspect of
copyright law which is not present in the statute. This concept is droit
mora/., moral right. The civil law countries provide a cause of action
for violation of an author's droit mora! to obtain redress for deformation of the artist's work. 54 The law recognizes that an artist may have a
continuing interest in the presentation of his work despite his surrender
of all economic interest in the work. American courts have not explicitly recognized a moral right. 55 However, courts have found a variety
of conventional theories which can be used to vindicate that right. For
example, a contractual retention of control could be implied into the
copyright grant. 56 A distorted presentation of the author's work could
be classified as a misrepresentation to the audience on which the author
is financially dependent. Also, when a work is distorted but still published under the original author's name, courts can find a misstatement
of source;57 redress for such misstatement may be had under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act,58 the federal unfair competition law.
In the area of creditors' rights, the implications of the moral right
concept are important. This concept highlights the difference between
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id
See House Report, supra note 3, at 5739.
3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.04, at 10-41 (1982).
See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 4](a) and 44(i) ifthe Lanham ACI-A Judicial
Shell Game?, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 377,379 (1980).
55.ld at 377. But see Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14,23-24 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing
that courts have granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work based on
theories outside the statutory law of copyright).
56: See, e.g., GiIIiam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14,21 (2d Cir. 1976) (agreement interpreted as
reserving to author the authority to prevent revisions of work); Granz v. Harris,
198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (contractual duty to attribute work implies duty not to
distort work).
57. See, e.g., GiIIiam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. 15 U.S.c. § 1125(a) (1976).
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a copyright and other types of property, such as a carload of steel coils.
Both are property which can be used to satisfy debts. Surely the manufacturer of the coils would be saddened to see them seized, but presumably he has no continuing interest in what happens to them. The
author or artist may see his work as an extension of himself and may
feel as strongly as a parent feels about a child regarding the treatment
of the work. Second, although the Copyright Act does not recognize
the moral right, the fact that courts find ways to give expression to the
moral right may influence the result reached where copyright law is
ambiguous. Having reviewed the recent developments in creditors'
law, as well as specific Copyright Act provisions and concepts, it is important to address specific conflicting provisions with regard to secured,
unsecured, and government creditors.
III.
A.

SECURITY INTERESTS IN COPYRIGHTS
Slale-Federal COIif/iclS

Since problems involving secured transactions and copyrights are
controlled by two comprehensive statutes, both of which were recently
enacted, it is surprising that there is much confusion in the interplay of
these federal and state laws. It appears, however, that the drafters of the
Copyright Act gave little thought to security interests and that the
drafters of Article Nine gave little thought to copyrights.
As this conflict involves federal and state legislation, it is important to consider the federal preemption doctrine, which requires that
when Congress has legislated pursuant to a constitutional grant, state
law may not controvert federallaw. 59 If, however, the federal statute
does not resolve a particular issue, it may be permissible to resort to
state law. State law can have effect only if the constitutional grant to
Congress does not preclude any state legislation. 60 Copyright is such
an area. 61 However, any state law which does deal with copyright issues cannot stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."62 This issue was addressed in a case in which a state law prevented "blind booking" of film
rights by film distributors. 63 Blind booking requires theatre owners to
commit themselves to the showing of films before actually seeing them
and, therefore, affects profits earned. Since profitable distribution of
59. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
60. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973). The Court cited The Federalist
for the three instances in which the constitutional grant to the federal government
is deemed exclusive: (I) the Constitution expressly states that the grant is exclusive; (2) the Constitution expressly limits state authority; and (3) state law would
be inherently contradictory of any national law. Id at 552-53 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 305 (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
61. Id at 559.
62. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), cited with approval in Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
63. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
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films is also made possible by copyright protection, it was argued that
the state law which impeded such distribution interfered with the
Copyright Act. 64 The court, however, determined that the state statute
did not undermine any congressional purpose and, therefore, upheld
the law. 65
The preemption doctrine is explicitly incorporated into the Copyright Act by section 301 which preempts any state law which both deals
with subject matter within the scope of the Act and provides rights
equivalent to copyright. 66 The preemption doctrine is also included in
Article Nine which expressly provides that it does not apply "to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent
that such statute governs rights of parties to and third parties affected
by transactions in particular types of properties. "67 This provision adds
nothing to the law since, even without it, state law could not conflict
with federal law regarding federally created rights.68 The difficult
question, however, is determining the extent to which state law may be
resorted to in resolving particular issues when copyright law is ambiguous or nonexistent.
Security interest problems usually involve two issues: enforceability, whether the secured party obtains rights in the property against the
debtor; and perfection, whether the secured party has rights against
third parties such as purchasers of the collateral or other secured parties. Both the Copyright Act and Article Nine have provisions relating
to those two issues. 69
B.

Obtaining a Security Interest

As indicated earlier, the provisions in the Copyright Act governing
a transfer of ownership also govern a grant of a security intereseo
Ownership of a copyright may be transferred by "any means of conveyance"71 but is not valid unless "an instrument of conveyance, or a note
or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner.'>72 The requirement of a writing appears also in Article Nine. 73
The required writing, however, is a "security agreement" defined as a
document "which creates or provides for a security interest."74 There is
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id at 655.
Id at 650-51.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 301(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
V.C.c. § 9-104(a).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 V.S. 52 (1941).
Copyright Act of 1976,17 V.S.c. §§ 201-204 (Supp. IV 1980) (transfers of ownership); id § 205 (recordation and priorities); V.c.c. §§ 9-201 to -204 (enforceability); id §§ 9-301 to -318 (perfection and priorities).
See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 201(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
Id § 204(a).
V.c.c. § 9-203(1)(a).
Id § 9-105(1)(1).
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some dispute as to whether a security agreement must contain a granting clause which explicitly creates the security interest. 75 If Article
Nine is interpreted as necessitating such a clause, then the state law
requirements for the creation of a security interest are stricter than the
Copyright Act's transfer provision requiring merely a memorandum. 76
One writer has interpreted the Copyright Act's reference to a memorandum to mean that even a subsequent confirmation in writing of a
prior oral agreement validates the grant ab initio. 77
It could be argued that the Article Nine rules cannot prevail since
they conflict with the Copyright Act. Congress has explicitly provided
a more lenient memorandum requirement. In fact, the requirement appears to be significantly more lenient than the old Copyright Act which
required "an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor."78 Opting
for the Article Nine requirement would produce the apparently anomalous result that the procedure for sale of a copyright is simpler than for
creating a security interest. However, the language of the Copyright
Act does support an argument that it sets forth only the minimum requirements and that states may impose additional requirements for
particular types of transfers. 79
The most convincing argument to resolve this dispute is that imposition of the state requirements does not conflict with the congressional
purpose of creating a valuable property right for authors. The state law
does not dilute the value of the copyright and thereby discourage creativity; instead, it protects the copyright owner. Lending parties aware
of the Article Nine requirements in advance can, with no additional
cost, comply with them. The apparent anomaly is explained by the fact
that a sale usually accompanies greater evidence of intent since the
buyer begins to use the copyright immediately, whereas a lender takes
no visible action until foreclosure. Therefore, it is reasonable to require better documentation for the grant of a security interest.
One additional Article Nine requirement not found in the Copy75. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-3, at 904-10
(2d ed. 1980).
76. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 204(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
77. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1O.03[A], at 10-34 (1982).
78. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.c. § 28 (1976) (repealed 1976). But see Khan v.
Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450 (S.D. N.Y.), affd, 105 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947)
(written assignment of copyright deemed to relate back to time of parol assignment two years earlier).
79. Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "a transfer . . . is not
valid unless . . . ." (emphasis added). It might be argued that if Congress had
intended to prevent additional state imposed requirements, the statute would have
read "a transfer is valid!/,' and, therefore, it merely sets forth minimum requirements as written. Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history indicating a
desire to provide a more lenient requirement for copyright security interest documentation than state law requires for other property. In fact, the language that a
copyright may be transferred by "any means of conveyance" implies that state law
means of conveyance are applicable and that the transfer, therefore, would have
to comply with state law.
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right Act is that value must be given to create a security interest. 8o
Since the definition of "value" is so sweeping,81 it is difficult to conceive
of a security interest transaction that would not involve the giving of
value. This requirement is more significant for dating attachment of a
security interest for purposes of priority. 82
C

Peifection

of Security Interests

Both the Copyright Act and Article Nine provide a system of recordation of ownership transfers to give notice to third parties. When
that transfer is a security interest, normally the Article Nine recordation system applies. With copyrights, however, the preemption doctrine would obviate resort to a state filing system if use of such system
contravenes the Copyright Act. Article Nine itself has a provision
which specifically incorporates that doctrine with regard to recordation
req uirements. 83
Under the old Copyright Act, there was no problem because security interests in copyrights were subject to federal recordation even absent a prior copyright registration. 84 Under the present Copyright Act,
use of the Copyright Act filing system is not always available or appropriate. There may be no copyright registration, an absolute prerequisite for a filing to be effective. 85 One instance involves a book or movie
prepared in stages. 86 Each copyright registration of such a work covers
only the portions prepared at the time the copyright is registered. If an
80. v.c.c. § 9-203(1)(b). The value requirement previously appeared as § 9-204 of
the 1962 edition of the VCc.
81. The VCC provides that "a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them (a) in
return for a binding commitment to extend credit ... (b) as security for . . .
satisfaction of a pre-existing claim ... (c) by accepting delivery ... [of] a preexisting ... purchase; or (d) ... in return for any consideration . . . . " U.c.c.
§ 1-201(44).
82. In the Copyright Act of 1976, § 205(e) dates priority from the time the transfer is
"executed." 17 V.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 204 is titled "execution"
but it only states that a tran~fer is not valid without a writing. Id § 204. It has
also been demonstrated that a subsequent memorandum will suffice as a writing.
The date of execution would not, therefore, necessarily be the date of the writing.
If, for purposes of a security interest, execution occurs when the security interest
becomes enforceable, it would not occur until value is given. For purposes of
§ 205(e), priority would date from the time value is given.
83. V.c.c. § 9-302(3).
84. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 V.S.c. § 30 (1976) (repealed 1976). Even though § 30
refers only to assignments, any doubt regarding the availability of Copyright Office recording for security interests appears to be settled by regulations providing
for recordation of mortgages. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral- Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1580-81
(1981).
85. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that documents must be recorded "in the
manner required to give constructive notice." 17 U.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
The Act also provides that the work must be registered in order for a filing to give
constructive notice. Id § 205(c).
86. The practices of the movie industry are discussed in Note, Transfers o.f Copyrights
for Security Under the New Copyright Act, 88 YALE L.J. 125, 128-29 (1978).
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author completes five chapters of a book and has that portion registered, a subsequently completed sixth chapter would not be covered by
the registration. If the sixth chapter were not registered, a security interest recordation would not cover the sixth chapter and the security
interest as to that chapter would be unperfected. There are other potential situations in which a Copyright Office filing may not be appropriate to perfect a security interest. An author may feel that the work is
of little value and does not require registration. A valid security interest in unregistered works and works that are not specifically identified
in the recorded documents may be created. 8? However, the Copyright
Act does not provide for valid perfection of these interests.
In any such situation, it would be important to determine whether
an Article Nine filing is effective. The result might differ depending on
whether a state adopted the 1972 amendments to Article Nine. Therefore each edition of Article Nine should be examined separately. Although a financing statement is necessary to perfect a security interest
in a general intangible such as a copyright,88 section 9-302(3) of the
pre-1972 Article Nine provides, in pertinent part, "The filing provisions
of this Article do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a
statute (a) of the United States which provides for a national registration or filing of all security interests in such property . . . . "89 Under
the new Copyright Act, there are security interests that cannot be perfected by recordation. Therefore, since the statute does not provide for
a national registration of all copyright security interests, UCC section
9-302 could be interpreted to require state recordation of all copyrights.
But such an interpretation might be invalid in light of the preemption
doctrine. The Copyright Act provides a clear statement that where at
least one copyright transfer is recorded in the manner required to give
constructive notice, that transfer has priority vis-A-vis later transfers. 90
Since that is clearly a national registration system, the UCC could be
interpreted to mean that no grants of security interests in copyrights
can be recorded in state files. A plausible interpretation of section 9302(3) is that the filing provisions of Article Nine do not apply to those
copyrights for which a Copyright Act filing would be effective to perfect a security interest. However, where the copyright is not registered,
a UCC filing could be effective. 91
87. Additionally, a business may own material that has copyright protection but
which has been distributed so that it has been placed in the public domain by
publication. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
88. The VCC defines a general intangible as "any personal property (including things
in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and
money." V.c.c. § 9-106. Comment 1 expressly includes copyrights. Section 9302(1) lists the exceptions to the filing requirement; general intangibles are not
excepted.
89. V.e.e. § 9-302(3) (1962 version) (emphasis added).
90. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.c. § 205(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
91. This argument requires defining "such property" to mean registered copyrights
but not unregistered copyrights.
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Article Nine may be interpreted in such a way that, absent copyright registration, a state filing may be effective. Whether this approach
conforms to the copyright law has not yet been addressed by any court.
If it is recognized that once a copyright is registered the federal filing
system must be exclusive, the new Copyright Act can be viewed as having an anti-clutter provision which allows for two levels of copyright
protection. The "federal" level is the more expensive and burdensome,
requiring registration in the federal system. The "state" level is available only when the parties desire it. A security interest in a particular
work which is unregistered or an unregistered addition to a work which
is registered would be perfected by filing in the state system. Of course,
the secured party would always take the risk that the copyright would
be subsequently registered and that the later secured lender or purchaser would record in the Copyright Office. But that is a risk the secured party takes voluntarily and it is perfectly consistent with an
Article Nine policy of placing the burden on the secured party to police
the debtor. 92 Moreover, such an interpretation of Article Nine and the
Copyright Act would not compromise the statutory purpose of providing an artist a reasonable monopoly. It is true that reliance on state
filing is risky, a risk that might translate into a lower value for the copyright. That risk, however, could be totally eliminated by registration
and recordation in the Copyright Office.
The 1972 revisions of Article Nine contain language which makes
it more difficult to conclude that although a state filing is ineffective if
there is a copyright registration, it is of at least questionable effectiveness if there is no federal registration. The relevant language of the
new section 9-302(3) reads: "The filing of a financing statement . . . is
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to (a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a
national. . . registration. . . or which specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this Article . . . ."93 Certainly when there is a
federal registration, an Article Nine filing is neither effective nor necessary. However, the provision that a financing statement is not effective
when a national registration is available or a place of filing is specified
does not seem to leave open the possibility of an Article Nine filing
even when there is no federal registration. It does not appear that any
thought was given to the effect of this change with regard to copyrights. 94 A strained interpretation of the new section 9-302(3)(a) which
would effectuate state filing when there is no federal registration is as
follows: when the particular copyright is unregistered, the national
filing is unavailable and, therefore, there is no place of filing specified.
92. See v.e.e. § 9-307. For example, one risk that a secured party takes is that the
debtor will remove collateral from the state.
93. /d. § 9-302(3)(a) (emphasis added).
94. The change was made because of problems with state certificate of title laws.
V.e.C. app. II § 9-302 reasons for 1972 change.
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The term "registration" would need to be construed as referring only to
property for which registration of all transfers of ownership are required. Since such transfers are not "registered" for copyrights but
merely "recorded," the reference to registration is not relevant to copyright problems. Such an interpretation of section 9-302 is consistent
with the section's probable purpose of avoiding state regulation when it
is preempted.
D.

Foreclosure Procedure

Although the Copyright Act recognizes the right to hypothecate a
copyright, it provides no rule of procedure for the foreclosure of a security interest. Part five of Article Nine provides a law of foreclosure
of security interests which is probably applicable to copyrights. 95 In
1952 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
that state courts, not federal courts, had jurisdiction over foreclosure
proceedings. 96 The court rejected the contention that since federal
courts had jurisdiction of any action "arising under" the copyright statute,97 the federal courts must have jurisdiction over copyright foreclosure. The decision is based on an analogy to patent law and a
presumption of "restriction on federal jurisdiction in the absence of a
clear grant," resulting from the limited jurisdiction of federal courtS. 98
The decision implies that foreclosure actions do not "arise under" the
Copyright Act and that therefore state law controls. 99
There is a sounder basis on which to find that state law should
apply: Congress recognizes security interests, so a fortiori there must be
some procedure for foreclosure; this cannot be an area where Congress
by silence meant there should be no rule. 100 The purpose of providing
artists with a monopoly of reasonable duration would not be defeated
95. U.e.e. §§ 9-501 to -5IS.
96. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
97. Title 28, § 1338(a) of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that federal "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights." 28 U.S.c. § 1338(a)
(1976).
9S. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir.
1952). See a/so Newman v. Crowell, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99. The assumption throughout a discussion of foreclosure is that the agreement creating the security interest contains a power of sale. Otherwise, the secured party
would need assistance in seizing the copyright, thus implicating a discussion of
unsecured creditors' rights. See notes 112-50 and accompanying text i'!fra. Some
security agreements neglect to include such a provision. See, e.g., Vol. 1796 U.S.
Copyright Office Files, Security Agreement and Assignment of Copyrights by
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 262 (1980). Other secured parties apparently acquire
the power of sale by structuring the security agreement as an assignment of all
rights to the lender with the borrower retaining rights to exploit the copyright.
See, e.g., Vol. 1813 U.S. Copyright Office Files, Collateral Assignment of Rights
of Orion Pictures Co. 23 (1980).
100. Even when Congress is silent, the court may construe an intent to preempt any
state legislation. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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by following potentially non-uniform procedures in foreclosure. 101
This is based on the fact that the details of the procedures of foreclosure do not impact on the nature of the voluntary transaction into
which the copyright owner and his lender enter. This is particularly
true since the applicable state law gives the creditor the obligation of
proceeding in a commercially reasonable manner. 102
E

Right to Terminate

When a copyright is involved, secured creditors must be aware of
the author's right to terminate a transfer. 103 Since the grant of a security interest is considered to be a grant of a transfer,I04 the termination
provision applies to security interests as well as outright sales. However, the underlying rationale of the termination provision, inability to
predict the copyright's value years in advance,105 appears inapplicable
to security interests. Upon sale of the debtor's property, secured parties
are required to tum over to the debtor the amount received exceeding
the amount of the outstanding debt. 106 Therefore, the copyright owner's inability to predict the copyright's value years in advance is irrelevant since he benefits from the increase in value. If the copyright has
not substantially appreciated in value but there exists some reasonable
possibility it might, the secured party should be just as reluctant as the
author to sell it. 107 Presumably a secured lender can mitigate the
harshness of the right to termination by specifying that the termination
of transfer is an event of default. Since the right of termination does not
arise for thirty-five years, it is doubtful that conventional secured lending transactions would be implicated.
The right to terminate does raise some questions concerning security interest foreclosure sales. Although providing that the author may
terminate the transfer thirty-five years after the grant,108 the statute is
ambiguous as to when the thirty-five years begins to run, I: e., from the
date of the grant of the security interest or from the date of the foreclosure sale. This is significant for two reasons. First, if the author does
not exercise his right to terminate within the specified two- to ten-year
period, he loses his right. 109 Second, the third party who purchases the
101. Although Article Nine has been adopted in 49 states, it is conceivable that states
might adopt variations which would make the procedure for foreclosure non-uniform. It is for this reason the text refers to those procedures as "potentially nonuniform."
102. V.e.e. § 9-504(3).
103. See text accompanying notes 41, 43-48 supra.
104. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 V.S.e. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
105. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
106. V.e.e. § 9-504(2).
107. While, in the case of a public sale, the secured party could purchase the property
being sold, V.e.e. § 9-504(3), the VCC requires that all aspects of the sale, including the time, be "commercially reasonable." Id
108. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.e. § 203(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
109. Id § 203(a)(4)(A).
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copyright at a foreclosure sale must be able to determine the length of
his ownership. Consider the situation where a copyright is granted as
security in year one and a foreclosure sale takes place in year ten. Does
the third party purchaser's absolute ownership rights extend for thirtyfive years or only twenty-five? Must the author give notice of termination in twenty-five to thirty-three years from the sale or fifteen to
twenty-three years from the sale?
Two arguments can be based on the statutory language to favor
dating the right of termination to the date of the grant of the security
interest. First, the only voluntary "grant" made by the author was the
security agreement. Second, the original grant of the security interest
includes within it an agreement to make a future grant, ie., the foreclosure sale; the Copyright Act's provision preventing waiver of the author's termination right includes within it "an agreement. . . to make
a future grant." I IO Thus, dating the termination right from the foreclosure sale, as opposed to the original grant, would be contrary to the
spirit of the anti-waiver provision.
But the foreclosure sale could be deemed an independent grant
since the author at that time does have the right to either satisfy the
debt or participate in the sale. III Furthermore, the foreclosure sale
often occurs at a time when the copyright is more fairly valued. Since
the rationale for the termination provision is the difficulty of predicting
the value of a literary work more than thirty-five years in advance, dating the termination right from the sale is therefore more appropriate.
IV.

UNSECURED CREDITORS

If a debtor fails to voluntarily pay a creditor who has obtained a
judgment, the judgment creditor is able to satisfy the judgment by sale
of property of the debtor. The method and terminology for this procedure vary from state to state. The basic procedure, however, is essentially uniform. The judgment creditor obtains a writ directing an
officer (usually called the sheriff) to execute on the judgment debtor's
property. The officer then seizes and sells the property at an execution
sale. 112 The issues which arise are whether copyright is a form of property which is seizable under state law, whether such seizures have effect
under the copyright laws, and whether the judgment creditor has priority vis-A-vis other claimants to the copyright.
110. Id. § 203(a)(5).
III. See u.c.c. § 9-506.
112. The initial writ is variously called writ of execution, fieri facias, or attachment.
The officer might be called a sheriff, constable or sergeant. There is also a supplementary procedure which is an outgrowth of an equitable process initiated by a
creditor's bill. The creditor's bill still survives in many states although it cannot be
used if property can be otherwise reached. See Riesenfeld, Collection of Money
Judgments in American Low--A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L.
REV. 155 (1956-1957).
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A. Amenability to Seizure Under State Law
There is reason to doubt whether a copyright is a kind of property
on which the executing officer may levy. Since at one time levy always
involved an ~ctual seizure prior to sale, it is easy to understand why
common law execution could not reach intangibles. I 13 Some intangibles have become so identified with a writing that seizure of the
paper itself has long constituted seizure of the obligation it memorializes. Examples are a negotiable instrument, negotiable warehouse receipt or security.114 A copyright, however, is a pure intangible; the
physical object which contains the copyrighted material and the copyrighted material itself are distinct forms of property. Sale of the object
does not constitute sale of the copyright. 115 Even possession of a certificate of copyright conveys no rights to the copyright. 116 Although at
common law the writ of execution would not empower the sheriff to
seize the copyright, recent statutes have expanded the reach of common
law execution to include intangible properties. I 17 Conceivably, therefore, a copyright could be reached by this process. I IS
Even in states where a copyright is theoretically available for
seizure, the rules or statutes establishing the procedures for seizure
often do not expressly provide for this type of property. I 19 This creates
113. See Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852). This is still true in at least
one state. VA. CODE § 8.01-478 (1977).
114. See, e.g., U.C.c. § 7-602 (warehouse receipt); id § 8-317 (securities).
115. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 202 (Supp. IV 1980). Accord, Stephens v.
Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852) (sale of engraving at execution sale does not
convey copyright); Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (execution sale of films and copyright certificates conveys no
rights in copyrights).
116. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 204(a) (Supp. IV 1980); see Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. See, e.g., CAL. ClV. FROC. CODE § 688(a) (West 1980) ("all goods, chattels, moneys or other property"); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (1980) ("any
property or credit").
118. There may be some value in relegating copyright seizure to supplementary proceedings. See text accompanying notes 130-33 infra. Generally, other assets
would have to be seized first and supplementary proceedings allow the court some
discretion in selecting property to be seized. Although states have generally abandoned efforts to control the order of seizure, see, e.g., Steinhardt v. Russian Orthodox Catholic Mut. Aid Soc'y, 366 Pa. 222, 77 A.2d 393 (1951), the philosophy
underlying droit moral may support such an approach by courts in regard to
copyrights.
119. For example, Subtitle G of the Maryland Rules of Procedure provides for seizure
of tangible personal property and garnishment of credits belonging to the debtor.
Garnishment involves a mini-lawsuit against the party owing property or money
to the judgment creditor. But copyright is a kind of intangible property for which
there is no appropriate garnishee because no other person owes the property to the
debtor. See also MD. R.P. G40-47. Pennsylvania provides for seizure of tangible
personal property, partnership interests and other intangibles by serving a garnishee. PA. R. 3108. It is clear that "intangibles" does not apply to copyrights.
See PA. R. 3254, which contains the appropriate form. California provides only
for the following types of property: "tangible personal property in the possession
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an unfortunate gap. If the levying officer is given no procedure for
seizing and selling the property, it is arguably of no value that the property is theoretically amenable to execution. However, the lack of a specific statutory procedure for levying on a copyright should not be
considered fatal. A law providing that "all property" is subject to levy
implies that some procedure to enforce the law must be available. 120
Conceptually there is no reason why copyrights could not be levied
upon. Seizure no longer requires that the court actualJy take custody of
the property. Even for tangible property, seizure often is no more than
a symbolic act. 121 Levy is better considered functionally as a process
which prevents, to the extent possible, deterioration or disposition of
the asset and which gives fair notice of the judgment creditor's interest
to other parties contemplating obtaining an interest in the property.
For this reason, seizure of a debt is often accomplished merely by giving notice to the debtor.122 It is perfectly acceptable, then, to consider
service on the debtor of a notice specifying which copyrights are being
seized as an appropriate levy.123 At an ensuing sale, the officer would
need only to give a receipt to the buyer. 124
The flexibility and liberal statutory interpretation promoted by the
foregoing argument is illustrated by a 1960 case decided by the Califor-

120.

121.

122.

123.

124.

of the debtor" (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 688(c) (West 1980); "property or debt
owed to the judgment debtor which is subject to execution but for which a method
of levy or attachment is not provided" (id § 688(b»; negotiable instruments and
securities (id § 487.01O(c»; tangible personal property in possession of third party
(id § 487.330); and "choses in action" constituting debts in possession of a business (id § 481.150). See also Peterson v. Sheriff of City & County of San Francisco, 115 Cal. 211, 46 P. 1060 (1896) (no method provided to execute on patent);
Lowenberg v. Greenebaum, 99 Cal. 162, 33 P. 794 (1893) (no method to execute
on seat on stock exchange).
See McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 535, 173 A.2d 39, 40 (1961) ("The
courts are enjoined to regard statutes [governing execution] as remedial in nature
and to construe them liberally in favor of creditors and claimants.").
Often the levying officer leaves the property in the hands of the debtor. See, e.g.,
MD. R.P. G46. It has been held that "[i]t is not essential that the [levying] officer
make an actual seizure. If he have the goods in his view and power and note on
the writ the fact of his levy thereon, this will in general suffice." Palais v.
Dejarnette, 145 F.2d 953, 954 (4th Cir. 1944) (quoting BURKS PLEADING AND
PRACTICE § 366, at 619 and construing Virginia law).
Seizure of a debt or obligation needs to be distinguished from a garnishment in
which the garnishee is required to pay money into the court. Seizure and sale of
the debt at the execution sale would result in the debt being owed to the buyer.
The buyer, of course, takes the risk that the debt will not be paid. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 688(b) (West 1980).
An analogous development is recent amendments to Article Eight of the UCC
which permit the creation of "uncertificated security" in corporations. U.C.C.
§ 8-102(b). An attachment or levy on such securities is accomplished "by legal
process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States." Id § 8-317(2).
Possibly, when a copyright is registered, levy should require recording at the
Copyright Office. In any event, when a copyright is registered the levy could not
bind subsequent purchasers without such a filing.
See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 671, 355 P.2d 481,483 (1960).
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nia Supreme Court. 125 A creditor had obtained a writ of execution to
levy upon the debtor's property, intangibles in the form of corporate
stock. The writ was served upon a corporation from which the debtor
had stock certificates. The sheriff purported to sell those shares at auction despite a statutory provision that the transfer of certificates was the
exclusive means of transferring shares. 126 Although the court held that
the corporation could not be compelled to issue new certificates to the
purchaser, the court did give some effect to the sale. The court pointed
out that the sheriffs sale did transfer "all the right, title and interest" of
the debtor. 127 Therefore, the purchaser became substituted to all the
debtor's rights, title and interest in the shares. Thus, the corporation
could pay dividends to the buyer, and the buyer could vote. 128 Of
course, if the debtor had sold the certificates to a good faith purchaser,
the execution buyer would have lost his rightS. 129 But until then the
execution buyer would have the right to locate the certificates and compel the debtor to transfer them.
The case is significant for two reasons. It distinguishes between
the execution buyer's rights against the debtor and his rights against
third parties, and it provides a method of reaching an asset of the
debtor that is not clearly provided for by statute. Therefore, when state
law provides that intangibles may be levied upon, notice from the sheriff to the debtor that a copyright is being seized should be considered
sufficient even though not explicitly provided for by a statute. In the
case of copyrights, when there is no certificate sirp.ilar to a stock certificate, recording of the transfer at the Copyright Office should be sufficient to protect the creditor and execution buyer from claims of third
parties.
If state law does not allow execution on copyrights, a creditor unable to satisfy a judgment may utilize a state proceeding supplementary
to execution. In such proceedings the creditor is entitled to compel the
debtor to answer questions regarding the location or existence of the
property.130 This may be of use in discovering copyrights or copyrightable materials of which the creditor may not be aware, since a search of
the copyright files in the Copyright Office under the name of the debtor
would produce nothing unless the copyright is registered. 131 Apart
from discovery, supplementary proceedings often permit the court to
125. ReynOlds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 355 P.2d 481 (1960).
126. The provision is similar to § 8-313(7)(a) of the UCc. The situation is more relevant to copyrights since California had not adopted a provision requiring seizure
of certificates for attachment or levy.
127. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 682, 355 P.2d 481, 489 (1960). See also
MCAlvay v. Consumers' Salt Co., 112 Cal. App. 383, 297 P. 135 (1931).
128. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 682, 355 P.2d 481, 489 (1960).
129. Id at 681, 355 P.2d at 488.
130. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 628(a).
131. As indicated in text accompanying note 29 supra, the debtor may not even be
aware that a federal copyright has attached to some of his works.
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order the debtor to relinquish property for sale in satisfaction of the
judgment. 132 Finally, the statutes permit the court to appoint a receiver
to administer the property of the debtor. Such a receiver could execute
the grant necessary to sell the copyright. 133
B.

Amenability to Seizure Under Copyright Law

It is necessary to examine the Copyright Act's provisions regulating transfers of own~rship to determine whether it sanctions the methods available to judgment creditors. Two sections are particularly
relevant. Section 20l(d) enumerates the types of ownership transfers
permitted, ie., any means of conveyance, operation of law, will, and
intestate succession.134 Section 204(a) sets forth the appropriate methods of executing such transfers, "by operation of law" or a "memorandum ... signed by the owner."135
When a copyright owner is compelled by a court to execute a
transfer for the benefit of a creditor, the involuntary character of the
transaction should not invalidate the transfer. Such a transfer involves
an instrument signed by the owner and is valid under the laws of the
state in which it occurred. A court-ordered conveyance would, therefore, be valid under the Copyright Act. Similarly, when a court-appointed receiver executes the transfer, presumably the law recognizes
the receiver as the owner and his signature as that of the owner.136
Conversely, when there is a sale of a copyright upon which a court
official has levied, there is no instrument signed by the owner. Nevertheless, in the absence of a signed instrument, section 204(a) of the
Copyright Act does provide for transfers "by operation oflaw."137 Although the statute and legislative history provide no guidance as to the
meaning of "by operation of law," both bankruptcy proceedings and
intestate succession were apparently contemplated. 138 The validity of a
132. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 628(d).
133. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 568.5 (West 1980); MD. R.P. 628(d). See also Scadden Flat Gold Mining Co. v. Scadden, 121 Cal. 33, 53 P. 440 (1898) (proper for
court to appoint receiver to take legal title and make conveyance); Olsan v.
Comora, 73 Cal. App. 3d 642, 140 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1977) (receiver can be appointed to collect simple money judgment); Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic
Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 515, 24 N.E. 784 (1890) (master can assign patent);
Gulf Mortgage & Realty Invs. v. Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 422 A.2d 1090 (1980)
(Court Rule 3118(6), stating court may grant relief deemed necessary, provides for
compelling turnover of stock certificate).
134. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 201(d)(I)-(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
135. Id § 204(a).
136. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1882) (patent can be reached by creditor's bill,
based on statutory language that conveyance can be executed by owner's "legal
representative"); Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass.
515, 24 N.E.784 (1890) (master can assign patent).
137. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. IV 1980).
138. Since the Copyright Act recognizes intestate succession to transfer ownership, id
§ 201(d)(1), it is not consistent to read § 204(a), requiring a memorandum, to
mean that such transfers are invalid. The language added to the involuntary
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levy and sale of a copyright must also be based on the phrase "by operation of law."
This result is supported by the use of the term "operation of law"
in section 20l(d), which sets out the types of transfers permissible:
namely by a conveyance, will, intestate succession, and "operation of
law."139 Since the statute specifies the three other forms of transfer,
"by operation of law" in section 204(a) must refer to an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding and judgment creditor levy. Presumably if
"operation of law" referred only to the one extremely narrow class of
transfers represented by involuntary bankruptcies, Congress would
have so specified.
The conclusion that the phrase "operation of law" in section
204(a) should be construed to countenance a sheriffs seizure is further
supported by reference to analogous situations involving the levy of
other personal rights which are subject to government regulation regarding transfers of ownerships. These involve the levy of trucking and
taxicab licenses issued by state and federal agencies. Modem courts
have consistently upheld the sale of such licenses. 14O The cases do not
make clear exactly how that levy is carried out. Presumably the certificate itself is seized although there is no pretense that the certificate is as
closely identified with the intangible property rights as is a negotiable
instrument or security. The seizure of the certificate, however, does
serve to give the debtor notice and to limit his rights to dispose of the
intangible. The courts often uphold these sales despite statutory language stating the license is not property and may not be transferred
without the approval of the issuing authority.141 The courts refuse to
read statutory requirements for approval of transfers by a state board
or commission to prevent execution sales. Rather, the courts merely
hold that the purchase of a license at an execution sale is subject to
such approval. 142 Similarly, sales of copyrights would require record-

139.
140.

141.

142.

transfer provision exempting bankruptcies from that provision indicates that
transfers as a result of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings are also valid. See
text accompanying note 147 infra. Therefore a transfer as a result of an involuntary bankruptcy must also be a transfer "by operation of law."
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 201(d)(I) (Supp. IV 1980).
See Barutha v. Prentice, 189 F.2d 29 (7th Cir.) (trucking license issued by state
sold by bankruptcy trustee), urI. denied, 342 U.S. 841 (1951); Fidler v. United
States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9507 (N.D.N.Y. 1972) (ICC Certificate of Public Convenience properly levied upon and sold); Mirin v. Clark County Taxicab
Auth., 90 Nev. 46, 518 P.2d 597 (taxi license properly levied upon and sold subject to Taxicab Authority approval), urI. denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1947); McCray v.
Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 173 A.2d 39 (1961) (taxi license properly levied upon
in execution despite statutory restrictions against pledging or mortgaging license).
See, e.g., Mirin v. Clark County Taxicab Auth., 90 Nev. 46, 49, 518 P.2d 597, 598,
urI. denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1974); McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 536-37,
173 A.2d 39, 40-41 (1961). The "property" language is present in statutes in an
attempt to shield withdrawal or denial of the license from constitutional due process scrutiny.
E.g., McCray v. Chrucky, 68 N.J. Super. 533, 540, 173 A.2d 39, 43 (1961).
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ing to be effective.
Another area of recent judicial activity which demonstrates amenability of statutorily created rights to execution process has involved
seizure of stock in professional corporations. Often there are statutory
provisions restricting the transferability of such shares to persons licensed in the profession. 143 Courts have held that these provisions require only that the purchaser of the shares be a licensed person or the
corporation itself but that execution and sale by law to a judgment
creditor is not prevented. 144
Even though "by operation of law" can be liberally construed to
include creditor seizure of copyrights, there is still one statutory barrier
for the judgment creditor. That barrier is the involuntary transfer provision, section 20l(e) of the new Copyright Act. 145 At first blush, this
provision prevents creditor seizure of copyrights to satisfy judgments.146 The fact that Congress amended the section to exclude the
bankruptcy laws from the prohibition supports the conclusion that,
without the amendment, seizure as a result of an involuntary bankruptcy would have been precluded. 147 Therefore, the involuntary
seizure provision may restrict domestic governmental seizures. 148
Only by ignoring the words of the statute and confining the involuntary seizure provision to its narrow purpose of preventing foreign
governments from suppressing dissent could a court avoid the use of
the provision to invalidate a creditor's seizure. 149 If, as argued, "opera143. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2911 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1982).
144. Gulf Mortgage & Realty Invs. v. Alten, 282 Pa. Super. 230, 239, 422 A.2d 1090,
1095 (1980). When the by-laws of the corporation prevented transfer of shares to
non-licensed professionals, a bankruptcy court held that the shares should be
treated as belonging to a professional who had lost his license and by state law
was required to redeem them. In re Andrews, 14 Bankr. 356 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
In some states, the execution lien of seized property relates back to the date
that the writ of execution is handed to the sheriff. Such a lien could not take
priority over a later transferee who records in the Copyright Office. Cf. In re
Cone, II Bankr. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (execution lien on airplane could not relate
back to defeat security interest perfected by filing with Federal Aviation Administration). The proposal that levy of a copyright gives the creditor rights against the
debtor, but not innocent third parties, is in line with Cone.
145. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (Supp. IV 1980). The provision is set
out in text accompanying note 50 supra.
146. See 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 98.
147. The last six words of the section, "except as provided under title II," were added
on November 6, 1978, effective October I, 1979. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 313, 92 Stat. 2549, 2676 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (Supp. IV 1980».
148. In reality, Congress does not seem to have considered the effect of the involuntary
seizure section on the right of a judgment creditor to seize a copyright. The House
Report states, "Traditional legal actions that may involve transfer of ownership,
such as bankruptcy proceedings and mortgage foreclosures, are not within the
scope of this subsection; the authors in such cases have voluntarily consented to
these le~al processes . . . . " ~ouse ~eport, supra. note 3, at 57~9. Note that.the
Report Ignores judgment creditors' seIZure, which IS also a tradltlonallegal action.
149. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra for a discussion of the purpose of the
involuntary seizure provision.
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tion of law" does refer to creditor seizure and the involuntary seizure
provision invalidates creditor seizure, the statute is inconsistent; it allows a creditor's levy in one section and prohibits it in another. To
avoid reading the statute inconsistently, courts should hold that the involuntary seizure provision prevents only foreign governmental
seizures designed to suppress dissent. 150
The above argument assumes that most courts would limit the operation of section 20l(e). That will not necessarily always be the case.
Given compelling facts a court may consider an involuntary seizure of
an author's work undesirable and, therefore, hold that the language
prevents judgment creditors from selling copyrights. The involuntary
seizure provision may thus be seen as a way of infusing droit moral
principles into copyright law. 151
V.

GOVERNMENTAL LIENS

In addition to secured and unsecured creditors generally, federal
and state governmental units comprise a particularly favored class
of creditors. Both the state and federal governments prescribe statutory
liens which attach to debtor's property to secure unpaid taxes. The
Federal Tax Lien Act l52 creates a lien on all property of a taxpayer
who fails to pay after demand. 153 While a notice of tax lien must be
filed in order for the federal government to have priority over most of
the taxpayer's transferees,154 the Act provides that limited classes of
purchasers and secured lenders can prevail even when there has been
such a notice filed. 155 Since the Copyright Act also has a filing provision to record a creditor's interest in the copyright, there is a potential
conflict between two federal statutes, the Tax Lien Act and the Copyright Act.
According to the tax lien statute the notice is to be filed "in one
office within the state ... , as designated by the laws of such State, in
which the property ... is situated."156 The property is considered located at the residence of the taxpayer. 157 If the state has not designated
one office that meets the requirements of the law, the notice is filed in
150. Since the involuntary seizure provision applies only when the author has not previously voluntarily transferred copyright, courts could also limit the scope of the
provision by allowing seizure of all of the author's interest in the copyright when
the author has transferred only a security interest in, or one of the exclusive rights
under, the copyright. Each of these proposed results resolves an ambiguity in the
statute in a way that would restrict considerably the effect of the provision on the
grounds that a more liberal interpretation would not serve to further the purpose
of that section.
151. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
152. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
153. Id § 6321 (1976). The lien relates back to the date of assessment. Id § 6322.
154. Id § 6323(a) & (f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
155. Id § 6323(b)-(d) (1976).
156. Id § 6323(f)(1).
157. Id § 6323(f)(2).
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the federal district court for the judicial district in which the property
subject to the lien is located. The Copyright Act requires recordation
in the Copyright Office. IS8 It is apparent that the states are caught in
the crossfire between conflicting federal statutes.
There are three possibilities to consider. State A specifies that tax
liens against copyrights shall be filed at the Copyright Office. ls9 State
D's statute provides that the tax liens for all personal property should
be filed in a particular state office. 160 Finally, state C makes no appropriate provision and, therefore, filings would have to be made in the
district court. 161 If the Copyright Act controls, a tax lien filing against a
copyright must be made in the Copyright Office, even in states Band
C If the Tax Lien Act controls, tax liens in state A must be filed in the
district court since the state fails to meet the one office rule.
There are no recorded decisions dealing with the conflicting filing
requirements of the Tax Lien Act and the Copyright Act. Two analogous cases involve conflicts between federal property registration systems and the Tax Lien Act. 162 However, those decisions offer little
guidance as they lead to opposite conclusions. The first case involved a
conflict between the Federal Aviation Administration Act and the Tax
Lien Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that federal tax liens need not be filed with the Federal Aviation
Administration 163 even though the relevant portion of the Federal Aviation Administration Act 164 is similar to the priority provisions of the
Copyright Act. 165 This would indicate that the Tax Lien Act controls.
However, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, in discussing a conflict between a tax lien and a lien filed in
accordance with the federal Ship Mortgage Act, stated, "Maritime liens
and proceedings are . . . 'of such a specialized nature' . . . Congress
evidently intended that field of law (Maritime) to govern exclusively."166 Since the Copyright Act is also a specialized provision, one
could conclude that the Copyright Act should control.
Resolution of the conflict requires consideration of the underlying
158. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 205(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
159. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 39B(1)(a) (West Supp. 1981).
160. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-401(b) (1981). This is a slightly modified version of the language of the Uniform Federal Tax Lien Registration Act,
7A U.L.A. III (1978), and the Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act. Id at 16
(Supp. 1982).
161. See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 62-66 (1972).
162. See CIM Int'l v. United States, 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980); Gulf Coast Marine
Ways, Inc. v. The l.R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
163. CIM Int'I v. United States, 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980). This is based on a provision in Federal Aviation Administration regulations, "A notice of Federal tax lien
is not recordable under this part, since it is required to be filed elsewhere by the
Internal Revenue Code." 14 C.F.R. § 49.17(a) (1981).
164. 49 U.S.c. § 1403 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
165. See text accompanying note 40 supra for the text of the statute.
166. Gulf Coast Marine Ways, Inc. v. The l.R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 385 (S.D.
Tex. 1952).
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rationale of both the tax lien and copyright statutes. The Tax Lien Act
attempts to give the federal government the highest priority conscionable in satisfying tax debts out of the taxpayer's property,,67 But even
when a tax lien has been filed, some transfers of property survive. For
example, it would be unreasonable to require searching a state filing
system for such transfers as personal property purchased at retail or iIi
certain casual sales. 168 The copyright statute can logically be read as
another specific statutory exception to the priority of tax liens filed in
state filing systems. To the extent that a purchaser cannot rely on the
Copyright Office registration files, the value of a copyright decreases
considerably. Therefore, giving priority to the Copyright Act is consistent with the philosophy underlying both the tax lien and copyright
systems by making an exception to the Tax Lien Act based on the reasonable expectation of subsequent transferees. At the same time, there
is no need to read the Copyright Act as prohibiting all use of state
methods of perfecting transfers. 169 When a copyright is not registered
and no transfers are recorded, a tax lien should be effective.
Using the above analysis for states A, D and C: state A's statute
requiring recording in the Copyright Office for tax liens is ineffective.
The Copyright Act controls and in some cases it (not state tax lien statutes) requires filing in the Copyright Office. When a tax lien filing
could be effective without copyright filing, state A 's statute violates the
one office rule. State D's statute requiring filing in a particular state
office is effective to the extent it does not· conflict with the Copyright
Act. In state C, a filing in the federal district court is effective to the
extent it does not conflict with th~ Copyright Act.
In addition to the federal tax liens, states also provide for tax liens
which attach to personal property.170 Where the lien requires filing,
that filing should be effective as to copyrights with the attendant risk
that a later copyright filing will have priority.
VI.

BANKRUPTCY

A bankruptcy case can be "commenced" by a voluntary petition
filed by the debtor or by a petition filed by creditors of the debtor. 171
The commencement of the case creates an "estate" which consists of
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." 172 Although
the old Bankruptcy Act specified that the estate consisted of all "inter167. Even many state-created liens which arise prior to the tax lien are subordinated by
use of the "choateness" doctrine. Liens are not specific as to lienor or amount of
the lien, and property subject to the lien is inchoate. See United States v. Globe
Corp., 113 Ariz. 44, 546 P.2d 11 (1976).
168. See 1.R.c. § 6323(b)(2), (3) (1976).
169. For a discussion of the use of state filing to perfect security interest in copyrights,
see text accompanying notes 83-94 supra.
170. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 322 (1980).
171. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.c. §§ 301-303 (Supp. IV 1980).
172. Id § 541(a)(1).
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ests in patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trademarks," 173 the current language is more expansive and "includes all kinds of
property." 174
No filing in the copyright records is necessary by the bankruptcy
trustee to perfect the estate's interest. The bankruptcy code provides
that the trustee may avoid transfers of property that occur after the
commencement of the case. 175 Although both the tax lien statute and
the Copyright Act support a conclusion that the Copyright Act controls
conflicts between the two, here the copyright provisions should not control. The Bankruptcy Act established a constitutionally provided for
orderly procedure for all creditors to share all the property of the
debtor.176 The Bankruptcy Act, unlike the Tax Lien Act, does not provide for classes of claimants to the property who do not take subject to
the lien. 177
When prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case an author
sells a copyright in exchange for a promise of royalty payments, the
right to those payments is the property of the estate. But if the debtor is
the owner of the copyright who has an obligation to pay royalties, the
trustee may have the power to sell the copyright free of that obligation.178 The author would merely be a general creditor of the debtor.
173. Id. § llO(a)(2) (1976) (repealed 1978).
174. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 367-78, reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5868.
175. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II u.s.c. § 549 (Supp. IV 1980).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
177. The only exceptions involve purchasers for value who take after an involuntary
petition is filed, but before the bankruptcy court issues an order for relief, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.c. § 549(b) (Supp. IV 1980), and some purchasers of real property. Id. § 549(c).
178. This would be analogous to a sale of goods on credit. If S sells goods to D on
credit, S is merely a creditor of D's. In such a situation, S's right to reclaim the
goods themselves is quite limited. See U.c.c. § 2-702 (seller may reclaim goods
only within 10 days after buyer's receipt of goods if buyer is discovered insolvent;
within 30 days if there has been a misrepresentation of solvency or intent to pay).
S becomes a general, i.e., unsecured, creditor of D's. Gilmore, The Commercial
Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1954). The author
could improve his position only by retaining a security interest in the copyright as
collateral for the royalty payment. Id. at 1060 n.7. See B&P Lumber Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 147 Ga. App. 762, 250 S.E.2d 505 (1978). Nevertheless, an
author might advance three arguments against the trustee's right to the copyright
free of the royalty obligation. The first is that despite the sale of the copyright, it
is encumbered with an "equitable servitude." See In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704, 710 (2d CiT. 1931). However, bankruptcy law generally
prevents equitable liens from encumbering the trustee's title.
Equitable liens were explicitly prohibited by the old Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 60(a)(6) (1976) (repealed 1978). That language, dealing
specifically with preferential transfers, was not included in the Bankruptcy Code
since the law of secured transactions was no longer ambiguous. Article Nine now
makes clear that equitable liens are unperfected security interests. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 209, reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
5963, 6170. See In re Washington Communications Group, Inc., 10 Bankr. 676
(D.C. 1981). While the former section 60 dealt only with preferential transfers,
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The author could only improve his position by retaining a security interest in the copyright as collateral for the royalty payments. 179
Since a copyright exists as soon as a work is fixed in tangible form,
a person has a copyright in notes, diaries and manuscripts existing at
the time the petition is filed. A professor's lecture notes may cause no
problem. But if a professional author petitions for bankruptcy, any
manuscripts ought to be listed on the bankruptcy petition. They could
then be exempted from sale (possibly at minimal value). ISO Otherwise
the debtor/author risks losing the bankruptcy discharge. lsl
VII.

LIMITATIONS ON THE VALUE OF COPYRIGHTS TO
CREDITORS
Judgment and foreclosure sales are notorious for bringing bargain

the same policy supports disregarding equitable liens in other contexts. Waterson
could similarly be explained by the unavailability of the means to retain a security
interest in a copyright at that time.
The author could also claim that the original grant contained an explicit or
implied restriction on assignments. Such a restriction should not be enforceable
in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.c. § 541(c) (Supp. IV
1980). Finally, the author might argue that the transfer of the copyright was part
of an "executory contract." Property rights of the debtor in such a contract are
governed by section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code which might either prevent the
trustee from assigning the contract at all, id. § 365(c), or require the trustee to cure
past defaults and give adequate assurance of future performance. Id.
§ 365(b)(I)(A), (t). The trustee could be prevented from assigning the contract on
the grounds that it is a "personal service contract" unassignable without the permission of the author. See In re P.H. McBride & Co., 132 F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1904)
(author had retained authority to approve future assignments, and the character
and relations of the publisher in the Catholic book trade were material due to the
nature of book). But see In re Howley-Dresser Co., 132 F. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
Moreover, an agreement whereby the debtor purchases a copyright in exchange
for a promise of future royalty payments would probably not be considered an
executory contract within the terms of the Bankruptcy Code. See Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: ParI/, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 451, 458, 460
(1973) ("Executory contract" does not include contracts the performance of which
is substantially completed by either the debtor or creditor, but only "a contract
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.") Professor Countryman does argue that patent license agreements could be considered
executory due to an implied warranty of validity. Id. at 501-02. But the case of
an outright sale of a copyright is distinguishable, especially if warranties are explicitly excluded.
179. Congress could afford authors relief if it so chooses. For example, consumers who
make deposits in layaway transactions are given priority in distributions. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.c. § 507(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). A purchaser of
real property of the debtor is, in some instances, given a lien on the property for
recovery of money paid towards the purchase of the property. Id. § 365(j). Congress could, therefore, provide for a lien of some sort in the copyright.
180. Id. § 522.
181. See id. § 727(a)(I), (4).
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prices for property.182 Several aspects of copyright and related law
contribute to that phenomenon. One is the termination of transfers discussed above. 183 When a copyright is seized, the author may retain the
right to terminate the transfer. The rationale for the non-waivable termination right, the difficulty of predicting the value of the copyright in
thirty-five years, supports that result. That difficulty may explain why
an author would resist selling the copyright to satisfy a judgment or
debt. If the judgment or debt remains unsatisfied when the copyright
transfer is terminated, the creditor could seize the copyright again. 184
The language of the copyright statute may also be interpreted to
prevent termination by the author. The statute speaks of a "grant,"
implying a voluntary transaction. But a sheriffs seizure is not a voluntary transaction; therefore, the termination clause would not apply.
Moreover, if authors are thus prevented from terminating involuntary
creditor sale transfers, presumably they would have incentive to seek
profitable sales elsewhere, the proceeds of which would accrue to the
benefit of the creditor.
Finally, it)~ likely that courts would find an interpretation limiting
the author's right to terminate more attractive. The inclusion by Congress of the non-waivable right to terminate resulted from judicial hostility to the nontransferability of the right of renewal. 18S Here again the
termination provision of the statute limits the value of the author's asset to a purchaser. However, if after a creditor's sale the new owner of
the copyright misuses the copyright or it dramatically increases in
value, a court could easily dismiss the above reasoning favoring nontermination and find the sale a terminable transfer: droit moral dressed
up in right-to-termination' c1othes. 186
Any execution purchaser takes the risk that there may be some
lack of jurisdiction that would nullify the sale. 187 To the extent that a
purchaser risks the sale's invalidation, the value (and hence the price)
of the property decreases. While a conveyance executed by a receiver
stands on firmer legal ground than an execution sale, there is nevertheless the risk that there might be a defect in the court's jurisdiction over
the owner or that a receiver's act would be found in excess of the authority granted by the court. Such defects would render the convey182. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 794 (1981) (collection of cases revealing prices obtained
at judgment sales).
183. See text accompanying notes 43-46 and 103-111 supra.
184. The validity of this statement depends on state statutes of limitations on judgments. In Maryland, by use of the writ of scire facias, a judgment can be kept
alive indefinitely. See MD. R.P. 624.
185. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. There are no cases which discuss the
effect of seizure of copyrights on th~ renewal right under the old Act.
186. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra for a discussion of droit moral
187. See Lincoln-Mercury-Phoenix, Inc. v. Base, 84 Ariz. 9,322 P.2d 891 (1958) (execution based on void judgment is void). Courts may also set aside a sheriffs sale
when the price is grossly unfair. See, e.g., McCartney v. Frost, 282 Md. 631, 386
A.2d 784 (1978).
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ance void. 188
Although a purchaser at an execution or foreclosure sale obtains
all rights included within the copyright, the author retains a variety of
state created rights which may serve to diminish the value of the copyright itself. Although the state created rights are often similar to copyrights, they do not appear to be preempted by the Copyright Act. For
example, a "personality" may have a right of publicity. 189 Such a right
is not seized along with the copyright. The purchaser of the copyright
would not have the right to exploit. the personality of the author in
selling the work. This limitation could affect the value of the copyright.
Additionally, there may be a right of privacy which can be invaded by
the public display of a person's work. 190 One state statute governs
proper attribution of an author's work. 191 Unfair competition law may
also be used to challenge profiting from the work of another or inaccurately identifying the creator of a work. The right to those potential
causes of action could not be seized by a creditor. The danger that
exploitation of the work may subject the copyright purchaser to a suit
for invasion of privacy or improper attribution also affects the value of
the copyright.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although knotty problems arise in the interplay of the Copyright
Act and creditor's rights law, consideration of the underlying purpose
of the Copyright Act (limited monopoly to encourage creativity) can be
helpful in their resolution. The Copyright Act can thereby be interpreted to allow for giving effect to state filings of transfers in some situations, and the U CC can be interpreted (or - if necessary - redrafted)
to that effect. Similarly state lien law can be interpreted in relation to
the Copyright Act to best effectuate the purposes of each. Finally we
have seen that there are sufficient ambiguities to allow courts to infuse
droit moral principles into Copyright law when courts believe that justice requires.

188. See Nicholson v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 60 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 605 (1933); McCutchen v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 5, 24
P.2d 911 (1933).
189. See Factors Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
190. See Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 99195 (1970).
191. See Folett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (construing N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976».

